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THE THREE-JUDGE COURT REASSESSED: CHANGING
ROLES IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
IN 1910 Congress enacted a statute 1 giving three-judge district courts ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over cases in which a petitioner in a federal court
sought an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of an allegedly
unconstitutional state statute. Appeals were to be taken directly to the Su-
preme Court.2 This legislation was a political response to a number of cases t
in which federal district judges had peremptorily issued orders striking state
enactments. Motivated less by hostility to the granting of injunctive relief
than by concern over the precipitate manner in which a federal judge sitting
alone could frustrate carefully planned state policies, Congress seemed de-
sirous of impressing federal judges with the serious and drastic nature of the
injunctive remedy. 4 The three-judge device, moreover, sought greater respect
and more willing compliance by those state legislators, officials, and citizenry
who might naturally resent the granting of an injunction.6 Since 1910 the
statute has been broadened by Congress to include cases in which orders of
state administrative agencies are attacked as unconstitutional,( and cases in
which no interlocutory injunction is sought; 7 the appellate structure has re-
mained unchanged. In its present form, as Section 2281 of the Judicial Code,
it reads:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of
1. 36 Stat. 557 (1910), incorporated in the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1162-63.
2. Ibid.
3. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction
Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907); Southern Ry. v. McNeill, 155 Fed. 756 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1907).
4. Senator Bacon, one of the sponsors of the act, observed in 1908:
If these [federal] courts are to exercise the power of stopping the operation of the
laws of a State and of punishing the officers of a State, then at least let it be done on
notice and not hastily, and let there be the judgment of three judges to decide such
questions, and not permit such dangerous power to one man.
42 CONG. REc. 4853.
And in 1913 Senator Overman remarked:
This legislation is demanded because a few judges have sometimes hastily or im-
providently issued interlocutory injunctions suspending the enforcement of a state
statute ....
H.R. REP. No. 1584, 62d Cong., 3rd Sess., at I.
5. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941). Senator Overman argued:
[I]f this substitute is adopted and three judges have to pass upon the question of the
constitutionality of a State statute and three great judges say that the statute is
unconstitutional, the officers of the State will be less inclined to resist the orders and
decrees of our Federal courts.
42 CONG. RFc. 4847 (1908).
6. 37 Stat. 1013 (1913).
7. 43 Stat. 938 (1925).
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any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute
or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting
under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless
the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges.8
Originally, there appears also to have been a tendency by the courts to
interpret its grant broadly. In 1911 the Supreme Court decided that the three-
judge statute deprived the single district judge of power not only to grant,
but also to deny, interlocutory injunctive relief.0 Moreover, in 1923, the Court,
faced with an unclear amendment to the statute embracing state administra-
tive orders, rejected a narrow construction which would have compelled three
judges to hear an attack on the constitutionality of a state administrative order
only when the constitutionality of the underlying statute was questioned.10
In recent years, however, the statute has been subjected to a consistent
narrowing process. The Supreme Court has significantly pared the jurisdic-
tional grant by holding that merely pleading a statute's unconstitutionality will
not suffice: the petitioner's claim must involve substantial elements of contro-
versy."1 A district court judge may decide sitting alone where the disposition
of the issue is controlled by unmistakably compelling precedent.' Further-
more, formal impediments have been placed in the way of three-judge invoca-
tion. The petition for relief must explicitly allege a constitutional issue; in the
absence of such charge, the district judge before whom the petition is initially
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958). Direct appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of
courts convened under § 2281 are permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). The single district
judge before whom the case is originally brought must determine whether it falls within the
three-judge requirement. If he decides in the affirmative, he must, under 28 U.S.C. § 2234,
immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who then designates two other judges, at
least one of whom shall be a circuit judge.
9. ExparteMetropolitan Water Co.,220 U.S. 539 (1911).
10. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923).
11. The lack of a substantial constitutional question may appear either because the
statute is clearly constitutional on its face, Dove v. Parham, 176 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ark.
1959) ; see also Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) ; California Water Service Co.
v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938); Osage Tribe v. Ickes, 45 F. Supp. 179, 183
(D.D.C. 1942), or because prior decisions of the Supreme Court have settled its constitu-
tionality one way or the other. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) ; Water Service
Co. v. Redding, mtpra; Booker v. Tennessee Bd. of Educ., 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) ; New Jersey Chiropractic Ass'n v. State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 79 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1948).
12. Where insubstantiality arises because prior cases have been decided in the plaintiff's
favor, the federal court retains jurisdiction, and the district judge may grant injunctive
relief. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) ; Two Guys From Harrison-Allentowm, Inc.
v. McGinley, 266 F.2d 427 (3rd Cir. 1959). But where the insubstantiality results from over-
riding precedent in the defendant's favor, and there are no other ground of federal jurisdic-
tion besides the constitutional arguments deemed to be "insubstantial," the district court
must dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933);
Bradley v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 130 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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presented may have no discretion to convene a three-judge tribunal.18 More-
over, a three-judge court cannot be convened where preliminary questions of
statutory construction seem so substantial as to raise doubts that the constitu-
tional question, though properly pleaded, will actually have to be resolved. 4
And where the action sought to be enjoined is not directly authorized by the
legislature or by an administrative agency properly acting under state law,
a single judge court is sufficient.'5
This process has taken place in the context of a concern for the possible
drain on judicial manpower which extensive utilization of three-judge ad-
judication might create.' 6 And although the existing restrictions have re-
sulted in substantial curtailment of the jurisdictional grant, the curtailment has
been insufficient to satisfy the critics. One commentator has suggested the
complete abolition of the three-judge system in constitutional litigation, argu-
ing that what he deems to be the irrelevance of its special abilities to modern
judicial problems renders its costs in judicial efficiency unjustified." Both
Justice Frankfurter '8 and Justice Warren 'o have joined the fray against the
three-judge court, though the remedies they suggest are not so radical. And,
giving a note of urgency to these criticisms, the number of cases decided by
three-judge courts has shown a marked increase 2 0-an increase which appears
all the more ominous in view of the overall crowding of federal court dockets.
It seems clear that both the courts and the critics, in weighing the problem
of inefficiency, have been balancing the possible drain on judicial manpower
13. Casev. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92,97 (1946).
14. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
15. In Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941), the Governor of Oklahoma in-
voked state constitutional powers in declaring martial law for the purpose of obstructing
work on a dam project to which the United States Government was contributing financial
support. The United States sought a federal injunction against further interference by the
Governor. The convening of a three-judge court to hear the suit was held to be error, on
the ground that "an attack on lawless exercise of authority in a particular case is not an at-
atack upon the constitutionality of a statute conferring the authority even though a mis-
reading of the statute is invoked as justification"; id. at 252; see Ex parte Bransford, 310
U.S. 354 (1940).
16. See, e.g., Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 156, 177 n.7 (1962);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 90-96 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ; Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941) ; California Water Ser-
vice Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 255 (1938) ; Oklahoma Gas & Elee. Co. v. Okla-
homa Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 391 (1934) ; Ev parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 569 (1928).
17. Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutlional Liligalion: A Pro.
cedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHi. L. REv. 555 (1960).
18. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, note 16 supra. In Kesler v.
Department of Pub. Safety, note 16 supra, Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion
establishing a "contingency" test (see text accompanying note 14 supra) which will probably
have a restrictive effect, notwithstanding the upholding of three-judge jurisdiction in Keslcr.
19. Dissenting in Kesler, the Chief Justice advocated the exclusion of all supremacy
clause cases from three-judge jurisdiction where there is no other ground of constitutional
attack, and noted that the special panel constituted a serious drain upon the federal judicial
system. 369 U.S. at 175-77.
20. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
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against the supposed utility of three-judge courts on the basis of an assump-
tion that the purposes of such tribunals are the same now as they were at the
time of passage, half a century ago.2 ' But it may appear today that there has
been a shift from the original grounds for passage of the special jurisdictional
grant, a shift which should be accounted for in any reevaluation of three-judge
courts.
To a significant extent, the sponsors of the act sought its enactment because
of a growing hostility toward increasingly frequent judicial interference,
through injunctive remedies, into legislative attempts to cope with economic
and social evils. In an era of reform legislation, the federal courts were cast in
the role of obstructionists.2- Because of this conflict, there was general agree-
ment among both progressive and populist elements that the courts' ability to
thwart the popular will through "government by injunction" must be curbed.-'3
The Progressive Party in 1912 published a declaration of principles which
included, among demands for "the rule of the people," "equal suffrage,"
"minimum wage standards," and the "prohibition of child labor," a demand
for "such restriction of the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the
ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and
public policy."24 Considering the responsiveness both major parties manifested
toward public sympathy for the Progressives in the 1908 election canpaign,5
it appears probable that one element of the original motivation for the three-
judge court act as passed was a determination to immunize progressive legisla-
tion from the harshly executed "judicial veto" power residing in the pre-
liminary injunction.
A protective attitude toward reform legislation was not, however, the sole
ground for substitution of the three-judge mechanism. Concepts of federalism
at the time embodied somewhat rigid and simplistic notions of separate spheres
of authority reserved to state and national governments.20 The increasingly
21. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960) ; Hutcheson,
A Case for Three Judges, 47 HA~v. L. REv. 715 (1934); Comment, The Three-Judge
Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronimsn, supra note 17.
22. See NASH, THIRD PARTIEs IN AmxiaRc PoLrrrcs 230-33 (1959); JAcxsor., TnE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREmACY 50-68 (1941) ; CROLY, PRooE~ssxrv D",ocnAcY 248-56
(1914) ; THE GREAT LEADERS AND NATIONAL ISSUES oF 1912 14-15, 56 (1912) ; GooDmow,
SocIAL REFRM AND THlE CoNsTITrroN 338-44, 357-58 (1911).
23. See PORTER, NATIONAL PARTY" PLATFoRmS 294, 296 (1924) (People's Platform of
1908); CROLY, PRoGREssrvE DEmOCRACY 251 (1914) (quoting Roscoe Pound); see also
PAYNE, THE BIRTH OF THE NEW PARTY 241-45 (1912).
24. PAYNE, op. cit. mupra note 23, at 306.
25. The Republicans' Taft campaigned under the banner of Roosevelt progressivism
against the Democrats' Bryan. SCHLESINGER, POLITIAL AND SocrAL HIsTORY op THE
UNTED STATES vol 2,457-58 (1932). See speech of Rep. Henry, 42 CoNG. REc. (Appendix)
248 (1908) ; speech of Rep. Hitchcock, id. at 192.
26. See, e.g., the groping comments of Sen. Burkett:
In my opinion we have had illustrations enough of this thing in the past to show
that there will come a time when Congress must, if it can, define the line of demarca-
tion between Federal authority and State authority in this particular line of cases.
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perfunctory use of injunctive remedies by federal courts on constitutional
grounds was perceived as presenting disturbing implications for the balance
between state and federal authority.27 Post-Civil War implementation of civil
rights and reconstruction legislation, the expansion of federal court jurisdic-
tion,28 and the enactment of laws regulating nationwide industries 2" and
transportation systems 30 had fostered state wariness of federal expansion.3'
And the Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Youtng,32 approving the use by
lower federal courts of ex parte injunctive power against state statutes, seemed
to indicate that the courts would play an aggressively creative role in the
further growth of the federal power.3 3 In response, the three-judge court was
I have never been one of those who have had any great fear of the conflict of Federal
authority and State authority. In my opinion there is no conflict and what seems a
conflict is only the inability to see just where the one ends and the other begins. I
believe there is a strong line of demarcation. It does not make so much difference, in
my opinion, to the State or Federal authority where that line of demarcation is, but
it is very important and very essential, in my mind, that we should know where that
line of demarcation is.
42 CONG. REc. 4848 (1908); speech of Rep. Williams, 42 CONG. REc. (Appendix) 280
(1908). The language is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's opinion in Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (13 W\rall.) 397, 406-07 (1872) :
There are within the territorial limits of each State two governments, restricted in
their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and supreme within their
respective spheres. Each has its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and
each has its own tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can intrude
within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial officers
with the actions of the other. The two governments in each State stand in their respec-
tive spheres of action in the same independent relation to each other, except in one
particular, that they would if their authority embraced district territories. That
particular consists in the supremacy of the authority of the United States when any
conflict arises between the two governments....
Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within
their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial
process into the domain of the other....
See also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 721, 725 (1868) ; Collector v. Day, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124-25 (1871); THE FEDERALIST, No. 39 (Madison); ANDESOX,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN REVIEW (Intergovernmental Relations in the United
States Monograph No. 10, 1960), pp. 19,25.
27. See Sen. Burkett's remarks supra note 26; speech of Rep. Henry, supra note 25, at
250.
28. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470.
29. E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
30. E.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, pt. I, § 11, 24 Stat. 383, establishing the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
31. Cf. Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, .wpra note 21, at 808-10.
32. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
33. See Justice Harlan's Dissent, id. at 204:
... such a result would, for most purposes, practically obliterate the Eleventh Amend-
ment and place the States, in vital particulars, as absolutely under the control of the
subordinate Federal courts ....
The dissent was highly praised and inserted into the Congressional Record by Sen. Bacon,
one of the sponsors of the three-judge act. 42 CONG. REc. 4853 (1908).
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conceived as a method of retarding overactive participation of the federal
judiciary.
It would appear today that both of these policies are inapposite. The federal
judiciary has been educated by thirty years of careful appointment by execu-
tives, and a similar period of decision-making by the Supreme Court, in the
necessity of respecting the regulatory choices of state legislatures. 3' From a
modern perspective, which recognizes elements of public interest in all signifi-
cant social acts, federal courts have seen the emptiness of the due process
considerations upon which they based their former obstruction of state regula-
tory measures.3 5 Moreover, even if the desires of the progressive supporters
of the statute are still relevant, the reason for its continued operation would
seem dubious, since the forum for progressive legislation has shifted from the
state to the federal legislature.3 Finally, the basic conflict in federalism at
which the three-judge device was directed seems also to have changed. Decades
of enlargement of federal powers, coinciding with a marked expansion of the
role played by the states in governing the lives of their citizens, have cast in
an anachronistic light the doctrine that a clearly-defined, static line between
state and federal powers is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the states
as relatively autonomous governing units,37 and have, as well, rendered im-
possible the demarcation of such a line.
In view of these political developments, it might seem that sufficient reasons
for preservation of the three-judge court no longer remain to counterbalance
its costs, and that it should therefore be discarded as a relic of an earlier age.
The device, however, still serves one of its original functions as a valuable
palliative to states which must occasionally accept the invalidation of their
legislation by federal authority.38 And, more important, the same changing
circumstances which worked to diminish the relevance of the original
congressional intent provide important new functions which the three-judge
court may-be able to perform. Since state and federal governmental responsi-
bilities have shown a marked tendency to overlap,30 a situation where con-
flict between national and local regulation is unavoidable in the absence of co-
operation has been created. Consequently, the need for recognition of the
superior claims of the former requires the reconciliation of state programs
to national aims.4 0 Thus, there is a current tendency to view federalism as a
34. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Exam., 263 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1959).
35. See opinion of Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 31 U.S.L. \,Vr.x 4376, 4377
(U.S. April 22, 1963) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
36. See KEY, AmmacAN STATE Poiincs: AN INTRoDUCTION 81-82, 266-67 (1956);
BENsON, THE NEW CENTRaAL ZATioN 41-42 (1941) ; ANDERSON, I rGo _n=.IETAL RE-
LATIONS iN REmVW, supra note 26, at 140-41 (1960).
37. See Key, supra note 36, at 4, 9; ANDERSON, THE NATiON AND THE STATES, RVALs
OR PARTNERS? 191-204 (1955) ; ANDERSON, FEDERAL AND IVTERGOVERNMEtNTAL RESLATIONS
14-15 (1946) ; BENSON, op. cit. supra note 36, at 104-08 (1941).
38. See note 5 supra.
39. See AaDEsoN, op. cit. supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., Beloff, National Government and Iteitrnational Government, 13 INT'L
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process to be comprehended not in terms of relations between the formal in-
stitutions of competing or cooperating governments, but in terms of increas-
ing responsiveness to the national interest on the part of local decision makers.
There is less need for responsiveness to state and local interests on the part
of the federal organs of government, including the judiciary, than there is
for responsiveness to the national interest on the part of local legislators. 41
Though the special tribunal, by its signal for caution, was once thought to
demonstrate greater regard for state purposes, 42 today its utility must be tested
by the extent to which it may serve to assist, better than a single judge court, in
the process of defending those federal regulatory interests which are bound to
conflict with growing bodies of state law.
But since conflicts between legal directives are typically a matter for judicial
resolution, the degree to which this responsiveness is to be obtained in the
case of federal-state conflicts may well depend upon the inclination of the
relevant judges to view favorably, accurately and uniformly the national in-
terest as articulated by Congress or the Constitution. When a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of a state statute clearly involves issues of constitutional
stature, the relevant judges will be those of a three-judge court. Appropriately
for its function, if surprising from the point of view of its creators, the three-
judge court appears to be particularly well suited to accomplish a resolution
of the conflict most consistent with the aims of modern federal policy.
A comparison between the composition of the three-judge court and the
single judge district court suggests that the former is likely to contribute
greater sensitivity to the purposes of national programs and the needs of the
Constitution. These effects arise from its additive character as well as from the
possibilities of geographic dispersion and greater learning which it presents.
Thus, each of the three judges brings to the court his experience in applying
and interpreting federal law in the context of federal social and economic
policies. The doctrinal progeny of Erie v. Tompkins further assure that each
judge, by participating, albeit indirectly, in the evolution of the state law, will
be sensitive to the efforts of state judges. 43 By its composition the three-
judge court provides a forum for the pooling of the national sensitivities of two
district judges combined with the broader frame of reference of a circuit judge.
Also, court sympathies with the "local" interest, already weakened by the
ORG. 538 (1959) ; Haas, The Challenge of Regionalism, 12 IN'L ORG. 440 (1958) ; Note, 71
YALE L.J. 344, 354 (1961). Cf. ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES RIVALS OR PART-
NERS? 211-13 (1955) ; Holcombe, Thoughts and After-Thoughts on the Future of Denocra-
cy in America, BRYCE'S AMERICAN COMmONWEALTH 113, 130-35 (Howe ed. 1939) ; ANDER-
SON, op. cit. supra note 37, at 14-16 (1946) ; LAsia, THnE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 562-63
(1917) ; "Nationalism, then, is Triumphant. The natural question any statute must now raise
is not whether Missouri or Alabama will benefit from its enactment, but whether the United
States will so benefit." LAsH!, op. cit. stpra, at 278.
41. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 344, 354 (1961).
42. See text accompanying notes 3,4 mpra.
43. See Corbin, The Common Law of the United States, 47 YALE L.J. 1351, 1352
(1938) ; Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Eric v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
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presence of a circuit judge, are presumably dampened further when a district
judge is summoned out of his home district to serve on the three-judge bench.
Despite these factors suggesting the special tribunal's greater capabilities
from a national point of view, the three-judge court may have a peculiar ad-
vantage over the single judge court in its capacity to encourage willing com-
pliance with the decree in the event that injunctive relief is to be granted.A' The
addition of two judges, one of whom is of circuit rank, increases the prestige
of the district court and reassures the public as to the breadth and thorough-
ness of the court's deliberations. Furthermore, public confidence in the im-
partiality of the tribunal is likely to be enhanced by the presence of one or two
judges from outside the forum district. Resentment toward Congress and the
federal judiciary is lessened insofar as the frustrated parties feel that their
case was given a degree of deliberation and concern commensurate with the
drastic nature of the relief granted.
But since it is a reasonable assumption that the courts of appeals are even
more nationally oriented and more prestigious than the specially-constituted
court required by the three-judge statute, a system of expedited appeals as of
right from single judge district courts to the circuit courts in cases now
within the scope of section 2281 might be considered a viable alternative to
hearings before three judges on the district court level followed by direct appeal
to the Supreme Court. Such a scheme would avoid the extremely disruptive
withdrawal of an already overworked district judge from his own seat of
jurisdiction without assurance that the three-judge tribunal to which he has
been summoned, sometimes from a considerable distance, will ultimately be
found to have been necessary ;45 it would also lessen the appellate burden of the
Supreme Court. The single district judge might liberally grant temporary
restraining orders or stays of execution in order to stabilize potentially inflam-
matory situations pending appeal40 Although the circuit court would have to
make room on its docket for the accelerated appeal, consequent dislocations in
44. In the 1908 Senate debates, Senator Overman commented as follows:
That being so, there being great feeling among the people of the States by reason of
the fact that one Federal judge has tied the hands of a sovereign State and enjoined
in this manner the great officer who is charged with the enforcement of the laws of
the State, causing almost a revolution, as it did in my State, and in order to allay this
feeling, if this substitute is adopted and three judges have to pass upon the question
of the constitutionality of a State statute and three great judges say that the statute is
unconstitutional, the officers of the State will be less inclined to resist the orders and
decrees of our Federal courts. The people and the courts of the State are more in-
clined to abide by the decision of three judges than they would of one subordinate
inferior Federal judge...
42 CONG. REc. 4847.
See Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HAv. L. REv. 795, 811 (1934).
45. See e.g., Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361 (1940) ; Willis v. Walker, 136 F.
Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 1955) ; Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 5S9 (M.D.N.C.
1955) ; Andrew G. Nelson, Inc. v. Jessup, 134 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Ind. 1955).
46. A district court may grant an injunction pending appeal, under FED. R. Crv. P.
62(c). Rule 62(d) provides for stay upon appeal.
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the overall flow of judicial business would probably result in less inconvenience
than is presently generated by the convention of a specially-constituted district
court.
Such an alternative, however, contemplating the complete abolition of the
section 2281 three-judge court, might resurrect the very same careless attitude
toward federal interference with state regulatory establishments which origin-
ally engendered the protest leading to its passage.4 7 Further, such a proposal
disregards the advisability of employing a more nationally sensitive tribunal
to make the lower court determination.4 8 Also, if an initial determination is
made by a single judge adversely to the petitioner, the possibility of multi-
judge determination would rest on the willingness and financial ability of the
petitioner to take an appeal to the circuit court, and the results of such an ap-
peal, if taken, will be strongly influenced by the single judge's findings of fact.
The participation of a tribunal of acute national sensitivity should not be sub-
ject to such contingencies. Moreover, abolition of the three-judge tribunal
overlooks the truly extraordinary nature of the present three-judge mechanism,
by which congressional and judicial concern for the gravity of the proceeding
is embodied in the presence of two extra judges, giving the parties tangible and
impressive assurance that their position will receive special attention. The
expectation of a quick appeal, although exceptional, is too abstract to convey
such a sense of urgency-to publicize to state citizens and officials the national
implications of what they had supposed was local action.
To the extent, however, that the manpower drain imposed by three-judge
jurisdiction sufficiently outweighs the advantages achieved through performance
of its new function, criticism directed at the continued utility of the statute may
be compelling. In fact, the Supreme Court itself has adopted the position that
the three-judge tribunal presents serious inefficiencies, 49 and has enlisted in
47. See text accompanying notes 22-33 supra.
48. Many of the cases dealt with by three-judge courts involve complex factual ques-
tions. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Southern Ry.
v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 91 F. Supp. 980 (M.D. Ala. 1950); Missouri-Xansas-
Texas R.R. v. Williamson, 36 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Okla. 1941). The factual determinations
would, under the proposed revision, be made by a district court of one judge, and would be
binding on the court of appeals. Thus the three-judge capacities for legitimation and na-
tional awareness would not be brought to bear on possibly determinative factual findhigs
until too late. Furthermore the three-judge court often is called on to grant or deny inter-
locutory injunctions in 2281 cases. Under the proposed scheme, the denial of an inter.
locutory injunction by the single judge would be appealable to the circuit court. In such
appeals, a "reasonable discretion" standard is applied to the action of the district judge, in
consideration of the latter's on-the-scene appreciation of the facts threatening injury to
petitioner. Circuit courts are reluctant to find an abuse of discretion. Thus the three-judge
function would not be operative on the district court level, and would be operative on the
circuit court level only within narrow limitations. Interlocutory injunctions would be largely
beyond the scope of three-judge consideration on their full merits, although the denial of
temporary relief might be harmful to that aspect of the national interest invoked by the
petitioner, and although the granting of temporary relief might evoke strong local resent-
ment. See Henderson v. Burd, 133 F2d 515 (2d Cir. 1943), 146 A.L.R. 714.
49. Supra note 16.
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support of its objections a perhaps fictitious congressional concern for judicial
efficiency.50 But while the Court's concern for the inefficiencies of the three-
judge court structure is expressed in terms of the "dislocation of the normal
structure and functioning of the lower federal courts,"' such arguments seem
most defensible in terms of unmentioned but severe demands upon the time and
energies of the Justices themselves, who, by Section 1253,52 have no discretion
to deny appeals from three-judge courts properly convened under Section
2281. Thus, during the October terms from 1958 through 1961, the Court de-
cided 36 cases on direct appeal from Section 2281 courts, 19 of which received
memorandum treatment. These cases constituted 0.48% of all petitions for re-
view placed before the Court.53 Assuming that all the memorandum decisions
received only the summary treatment usually given in denying petitions for
grant of writ of certiorari, the three-judge court cases given plenary treatment
constituted 3.5 7o of the Court's plenary decisions.54 Thus, despite some free-
dom to avoid decision, the court seems to feel obliged to give plenary treatment
to a substantially higher proportion of three-judge appeals than to other forms
of petition for review. Consequently, given the overall limitation on the Court's
capacity for plenary review,5 5 any increase in the number of appeals from
three-judge courts will result in a disproportionate decrease in the Court's
ability to grant writs of certiorari and, hence, in its freedom to choose the cases
to be heard before it.
One apparent answer to this problem is for the Court to cloak itself with
greater discretion by generous use of memorandum decisions and a procrustean
application of the "lack of substantial federal question" standard. 0 Although
50. Phillips v. United States, stpra note 16 at 250; see also Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 91 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
51. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, supra note 50, at 92 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52. This section provides:
Except as othervise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). For a detailed survey of the manner in which § 1253 has been ap-
plied in constitutional litigation, see Comment, The Three-Judge District Court and Ap-
pellate Review, 49 VA. L. REv. 538 (1963).
53. See tables published in The Supreme Court 1961 Tern, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 54, 81
(1962) ; The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HRv. L. REv. 40, 85 (1961) ; The Supreme
Court 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 81, 99 (1960) ; The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73
HAv. L. REv. 84,129 (1959).
54. During the four year period, the Court decided 7603 cases. Of the 496 decided by
full opinion, 479 were with oral argumenL See tables published in -Luv. L REv., stpra
note 53. The Court hears oral argument in only a small fraction of the cases given
memorandum treatment Only nine such cases were decided with oral argument during the
1961 term. 76 HARv. L. REv. 54,81 (1962).
55. See HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEw.FAT SYST,C 1394-1404
(1953).
56. Plainly, the criterion of substantiality is neither rigid nor narrow. The play of dis-
cretion is inevitable, and wherever discretion is operative in the work of the Court
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such an approach, converting appellate jurisdiction into the equivalent of certio-
rari jurisdiction, might be workable, a severe modification of the Supreme
Court's role seems undesirable. In the first place, so to limit review would deny
some appellants the one appeal "as of right" to a higher tribunal which adheres to
every other litigant in civil cases tried in the federal district courts and which
it is intended that they shall have.r7 Secondly, the fact that application of the
standard must be procrustean may have inadvertent and unfavorable doctrinal
results, since dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question, though moti-
vated by considerations of manpower efficiency at the Supreme Court level,
carries the implication that the three-judge court was initially improperly con-
vened. 58 Similar objection may be raised, moreover, to those cases which the
Court decides on the merits by unexplained memorandum opinions. Unlike
the denial of a petition for grant of writ of certiorari, memorandum decisions
have effects which, because uncertain, are unfortunate in their failure to give
guidance for future action.59 And the pressures to decide reveal the third
weakness of appeal, as compared with certiorari jurisdiction: the Court lacks
the pressure of its docket is bound to sway its exercise. To the extent that there are
reasonable differences of opinion as to the solidity of a question presented for de-
cision or the conclusiveness of prior rulings, the administration of rule 12 [now rules
13(2) and 15] operates to subject the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court to dis-
cretionary considerations not unlike those governing certiorari.
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Tern:, 1929, 44 IAny
L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1930).
Most attorneys are well aware of the fact that the Court may and does exercise its
discretion in passing on applications for certiorari but insofar as appeals are con-
cerned they harbor the mistaken impression that review is obligatory and that where
they lave an appeal "as of right" they are entitled to oral argument on the merits.
... Jurisdictional statements and petitions for certiorari now stand on practically the
same footing ....
Willey, Jtrisdictional Statements on Appeals to U.S. Supreme Court, 31 A.B.A.J. 239
(1945). See Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARy. L. Rrv. 84, 88-89 (1959).
57. [I]t has long since become impossible to defend the thesis that all the appeals which
the Court dismisses on this ground are without substance.... Thus, the Court seems
to have proceeded upon the view that a "right" of appeal not only does not include a
right to be heard orally, but does not include even a right to have the case con-
sidered upon plenary briefs. This view is hard enough to accept when it is the appellant
who loses. But when the practice works to the prejudice of the appellee through a
reversal on the jurisdictional papers, it seems impossible to reconcile with conventional
conceptions of due process of law. In such cases the appellee, having had no ade-
quate notice of the possibility, finds himself finally foreclosed without any real op-
portunity for argument at all.
Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HAxv. L. Ray. 84, 89 n.13 (1959). The appellant is
barred by § 1253, note 52 supra, from escaping these difficulties through an appeal to a
circuit court of appeals.
58. See Note, Supreme Court per curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. IRv. 707,
711-14 (1956). Even where the dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question effectively
affirms a judgment for plaintiff the same implication would seem to attach. Cf. Balley v.
Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) and text at note 11 supra.
59. Id. at 715-18.
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the freedom it might desire to postpone decision on large and controversial is-
sues to a later day.60
To the degree that the Justices' criticism arises from the appellate process
prescribed for three-judge courts rather than from the nature of the three-judge
device itself, such arguments do not justify curtailment of three-judge func-
tions so much as alteration of the appellate structure. Such modification seems
required if further gerrymandering of congressionally defined jurisdictional
boundaries by an overburdened Court is to be avoided. The problem must be
solved, not by narrowing judicial techniques, but by amendment or repeal of
the direct appeal statute.61 Since deliberateness and careful consideration, not
speed, are thought to be principal virtues of the three-judge court, such
lengthening of the appellate process does not seem destructive of the special
tribunal's worth, while it enables a more realistic approach to its potentialities
and costs at the original jurisdiction level.62
It is true that critics, including some Justices,63 have charged that judicial
disruption at the three-judge level itself constitutes a sufficient dislocation to
necessitate the abandonment or severe limitation of the special tribunal as an
integrative device in the federal framework. Convention of three-judge courts
causes further confusion of already crowded dockets and diverts judicial man-
power from the task of clearing those dockets. Such disruptions, moreover, are
60. See BIcKEL, THE LEAST DAN'GEROUS BRANCH ch. 4 (1962).
61. The idea of a direct appeal from a three-judge tribunal, now embodied in 1253,
originated with the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, which applied to antitrust cases
brought by the United States. Its scope has gradually increased as new classes of cases, in-
cluding those now within 2281, were required to be heard by specially-constituted courts.
HAr & WcssLEm, note 55 supra at 47-48. Prior to the 1948 consolidation in 1253 (62 Stat.
926), the various situations in which direct appeal was required were separately codified. See
Reviser's Note to 1253 (1958). That there is no necessary connection between three-judge
jurisdiction and direct appeal is indicated by the phrase "except as otherwise provided by
law" in 1253. Congress has in fact severed the requirement of a specially-constituted district
court from direct appeal in cases arising under Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act, 56
Stat. -790 (1942). And, in condemnation proceedings under the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act, 48 Stat. 70 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1958), appeal from the required three-judge
court (three district judges) goes to the court of appeals. Hence, a certain degree of
selectivity in connection with the direct appeal requirement would not be unprecedented. And,
in fact, the Justice Department has recently asked Congress for legislation substituting
review by the courts of appeals for direct appeal in antitrust cases (see Expediting Act of
1903 supra), except where the Attorney General or the trial judge certifies that the case
is of special importance. See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1963, p. 28, col. 6. If, in view of the
burden imposed upon the Supreme Court by § 1253, Congress were to permit an accelerated
appeal to the court of appeals from three-judge courts in certain types of cases currently with-
in the direct appeal requirement, with a right to subsequently petition the Supreme Court for
writ of certiorari the disadvantages of appeal to the intermediate court from a decision of
a single district judge (see note 48 supra and accompanying text) would not of course be
present. Moreover, if a speedy determination by the Supreme Court should appear particu-
larly desirable the Court may under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (1958) grant certiorari even before
the circuit court has delivered judgment.
62. See text accompanying notes 44-48 .irpra.
63. See notes 18 and 19 supra and accompanying text.
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heightened where judgments are reversed because of incorrect assignment as
between one and three-judge courts, 64 and where convention of three-judge
courts seems futile since the result is referral of disputed questions to state
courts for interpretation and decision. 65
Yet the relative infrequency with which three-judge cases have occurred in
the past suggests that these efficiency factors are not sufficient in themselves to
be dispositive of the fate of the three-judge courts. From 1952 to 1960, the
average number of three-judge courts heard per year was 54.4, distributed
widely throughout the 86 federal districts. 0 Three-judge cases represented
.512% of all trials commenced in district courts during the nine year span."
From this already small proportion and indeterminate number of three-judge
proceedings must be subtracted since they arose under statutes other than
Section 2281. 68 The federal judiciary itself, moreover, has provided tacit
recognition that the three-judge court does not constitute a serious drain at
the original jurisdiction level. Although the Judicial Conference and the Office
of the Administrative Director of the United States Courts have expressed
concern over increased district court congestion attributable to bankruptcy,00
personal injury,70 land compensation,71 and antitrust cases,7 2 they have never
mentioned multiple-judge panels as sources of congestion." On the contrary,
the Judicial Conference has for a number of years advocated the extension of
three-judge jurisdiction to include applications for writs in federal habeas
corpus actions brought by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state court7 4 But in more recent years the problem of crowding at the district
court level may have become more pressing than the figures mustered above,
and the apparent attitude of the Judicial Conference, seem to indicate. In 1962,
the number of three-judge cases was twice that of the previous year .7  Recent
64. As in cases cited in note 45 supra.
65. See, e.g., NAACP v. Bennett, 178 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ; cl. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam., 194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1961).
66. See 1960 Dir. Admin. Off. U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. (hereinafter cited as Director's
Report) 116-17; 1957 Director's Report 91.
67. The average number of trials commenced each year, from 1952 to 1958, was 10,675.
1960 Director's Report 103.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958) ; 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958)
and 49 U.S.C. § 44 (1958) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1958). See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIct 1
54.05 (4) (2d ed. 1953).
69. See, e.g., 1960 Director's Report 62; 1959 Director's Report 54.
70. See, e.g., 1960 Director's Report 80-81.
71. See, e.g., 1960 Director's Report 90.
72. See, e.g., 1950 Director's Report 113-14.
73. However, the Judicial Conference of the United States has sought the repeal or
modification of the three-judge requirement of the Expediting Act (anti-trust cases), 32 Stat.
823 (1903), as amended 15 U.S.C. 28 (1958), on grounds of judicial inefficiency. See 1950
Report of the Judicial Conference 13; Report of Attorney General McGrath, appendix
to 1949 Report of the Judicial Conference, at 36; cf. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1963, p,
28, col. 6.
74. See 1959 Report of the Judicial Conference 37, and Report of Attorney General
Rogers, appendix to 1959 Report at p. 48.
75. 1962 Director's Preliminary Report 11-20.
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trends in constitutional adjudication-the undiminished momentum of the
desegregation movement, the opening of the federal courts to reapportionment
suits,76 and last summer's prayer decision 77-suggest expanded use of mul-
tiple-judge courts under Section 2281.
It is certain that the continued drive to expedite the transaction of judicial
business in the federal courts will force legislative focus on the durability of
the three-judge provision as it presently stands. But a careful balancing of the
utility of three-judge courts in a federal structure against the inefficiencies
which admittedly exist must weigh the countervailing considerations not in
gross, but in particular classes of litigated issues. Complete abandonment of
the tribunal in the context of conflict between federal interests and state
regulatory measures will eliminate achievement of the peculiar integrative
function that three-judge courts can perform. Recognition of wastefulness in
the present structure, based largely on the irrelevance of the original motives
for the jurisdictional grant, requires not total abandonment, but a reshaping of
the jurisdictional standards to encompass only those situations where the
three-judge court may accomplish its most valuable functions. Through such
selectivity will come an alleviation of the burden upon the time and energies of
the federal judiciary.
Such selectivity is not foreign to the area of three-judge courts. Congress
has required three-judge courts in a number of situations: certain actions tin-
der the anti-trust statutes ;78 petitions for injunctions to restrain the enforce-
ment of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission ;0 cases arising
under Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act ;so and condemnation proceedings
under the T.V.A. Act.8 ' In addition, by providing special judicial protection
for voting rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1957,e8 Congress may be said to
have demonstrated that it would have the ability to condition federal three-
judge jurisdiction according to the weight it feels necessary for a particular
class of constitutional rights.
What guidelines, then, may serve to assist the congressional draftsmen in
recasting the jurisdictional grant? The present statutory standard, requiring a
constitutional challenge of a state statute or administrative order, is now a
blunt and indiscriminate tool for performing the task of functional selection.
The test of constitutional attack is too broad in the sense that it brings within
its sweep cases not needing the special tribunal's peculiar integrative talents;
its very breadth has invited the present judicially imposed narrowing, which
76. Sixteen of the post-Baker reapportionment suits compiled in Prof. McCloskey's
forward to The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HAiiv. L. Rnv. 54, n.14 (1962), and in a
Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionnuts: A Problem of Standards, 72
Y.LE L.J. 968 (1963), were heard by three-judge courts.
77. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
78. 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 44 (1958).
.79. 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1958).
80. 56 Stat. 790 (1942).
81. 48 Stat. 70 (1933), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 83 (x) (1958).
82. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344 (1958) ; 71 Stat. 637, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958).
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excludes issues for which the integrative function seems necessary. Three other
functional guidelines, however, may be suggested to assist in the specification
of issues for three-judge adjudication. First, the effect of the legitimating
function, secured by the extraordinary panoply of three-judge convention,80
seems desirable where an aroused, resentful reaction is likely to follow the
granting of an injunction. A situation requiring legitimation is most likely to
exist where the state statute under attack is responsive to widely felt political
attitudes; current examples are the racial segregation cases. Similarly, in reap-
portionment cases, where the federal court is likely to engage in a prolonged,
not always harmonious, dialogue with the state legislature, a three-judge court
would be appropriate because of its greater dignity and ability to elicit a
compliant response.8 4 And, arguably, the importance of the legitimating func-
tion in pacifying state objections is sufficiently strong to justify invocation of a
three-judge court, even when prior Supreme Court decisions have predeter-
mined the outcome of the local controversy.8 5 Second, the more acute national
sensitivities of the special tribunal suggest that statutory revision should pre-
serve its function for those cases in which a federal constitutional or statutory
provision requires strict uniformity of application throughout the country, for
example, the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.80 Finally, the ability
of a nationally sensitive tribunal to enforce provisions whose unobstructed ap-
plication is closely linked to some aspect of the national interest which
Congress considers particularly essential suggests that these also be placed under
its guardianship, where there is a possibility of conflict with state statutes. The
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,87 the Smith Act, 8 and the Civil Rights
Act 8 9 are examples of such provisions.
On the other hand, those classes of cases which fail to meet the stated
criteria can be withdrawn from three-judge jurisdiction. Fourteenth amend-
83. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson,
205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), discussed in 20 Congressional Quarterly Weckly
Report 1302, 1305 (1962); Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apporlionnients: A
Problem of Standards, 72 YAri L.J. 968 (1963).
85. See text accompanying notes 11, 12 mspra. Such a requirement would, of course,
be a repudiation of the Bailey approach, ibid.
86. 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958) ; see International Shoe Co.
v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). Part II of Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 898, 899
(1940), provides another example; United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945).
87. 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
88. 54 Stat. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958) ; cf. Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
89. 71 Stat. 634 (1957). Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), suggests another
type of case in which Congress might wish to guard the federal interest by requiring a three-
judge court, notwithstanding the additional strain on federal judicial manpower. On appeal
from a three-judge district court the Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Alien
Registration Act was invalid, on (supremacy clause) grounds of preemption by the federal
Alien Registration Act. The Court stated:
Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states,
no less than the interest of the people of the whole naiion, imperatively requires that
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ment attacks on state economic regulatory measures, for example, or similar
attacks on exercises of state police power for the public health and safety might
well be excluded from the jurisdictional grant, since they do not at present
fit the three integrative standards of legitimation, uniformity and essentiality.
In the absence of extraordinary cause for congressional concern over a con-
tinuing danger of confiscatory or discriminatory action, the national interest
is not sufficiently threatened by state unresponsiveness or unrest to justify the
additional strain on judicial manpower. In addition, new jurisdictional stand-
ards ought not to require three-judge hearing of supremacy clause cases, ap-
parently included within the present grant,90 unless the integrative function is
served in a particular type of conflict. Such cases, capable of decision and
public acceptance within the traditional structure of the federal court system,
should revert to adjudication by single-judge tribunals.
federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
interference.
Id. at 63. And if the Court's present or future use of the "no substantial federal question"
rationale could be found to create a pattern of abstention in particular categories of cases,
these categories might provide useful standards for excision or inclusion.
90. See Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962). There the Court
held that cases in which the supremacy clause provides the only constitutional ground for
attack upon a state statute raised constitutional questions within the meaning of § 2281.
Although in Kesler, the conflict between the Utah Safety Responsibility Act and the dis-
charge provision of the Bankruptcy Act would seem to require three-judge adjudication
because of the importance of uniform application of the federal statute (see note 84 supra),
the integrative guidelines suggested in the text accompanying notes 83-89 supra clearly do
not require that supremacy clause cases, as a class, be heard by three-judge courts.
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